Customers experiencing long, often inexplicable delays, their experiences turning from hopeful to angry to afraid they’ll never get back home. Staff overworked and overwhelmed. IT systems failing at the times they’re most needed. To most people, that all probably sounds like Southwest Airline’s debacle last week, but, to me, it just sounds like every day in our healthcare system.
Credit: ABC 7 Chicago
Southwest had a bad week. All the airlines were hit by a huge swath of
bad weather the weekend before Christmas, but most airlines recovered relatively
quickly. Southwest passengers were not
so lucky; the airline’s delays and cancellations numbered in the thousands and stretched
into days. Overnight, it seemed,
Southwest went from being one of the most admired airlines – loyal customers, on-time
service, happy employees, consistent profitability – to one with “its
reputation in tatters.”
CEO Bob Jordan has had to do
his mea culpas, and he’s not done.
Some pointed to Southwest’s reliance on point-to-point flight schedules, in contrast to other airlines’ use of hub-and-spoke models, but most seem to agree that the root problem was that its IT infrastructure was not up to task – particularly its employee scheduling system, which told its employees who needed to be where when and how to accomplish that. Casey A. Murray, president of the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association, told The New York Times: “Once one card falls, the whole house falls here at Southwest. That’s our problem. We couldn’t keep up with the cascading events.”
Mr. Murray also told
NPR: “We're still using not only IT from the
'90s, but also processes when our airline was a tenth of the size. And it's
really just not scaled for an operation that we have today.” Aviation analyst Scott
Hamilton agrees, telling
KERA News: “But the policies of being a skinflint on technology fall
to Herb Kelleher and every succeeding CEO since then…I think this was benign
neglect on the part of the leadership at Southwest across several
administrations.”
There’s a term for this, as Zeynep Tufekci wrote
in a NYT op-ed: “technical debt.”
Technical debt doesn’t mean that
the underlying code is necessarily flawed or poorly written so much as it
reflects decisions made at the time of development to defer getting the code “perfect”
in lieu of simply getting it implemented.
It’s work that is still going to have to be done someday.
Product Plan has a number of
definitions, such as Trey Huffine’s “technical debt is
any code added now that will take more work to fix at a later time—typically
with the purpose of achieving rapid gains,” or from Holvitie, et. alia:
Technical
debt describes the consequences of software development actions that intentionally
or unintentionally prioritize client value and/or project constraints such as
delivery deadlines, over more technical implementation, and design
considerations
Conceptually,
technical debt is an analog of financial debt, with associated concepts such as
levels of debt, debt accrual over time and its likely consequences, and the
pressure to pay back the debt at some point in time.
Credit: Melv1n |
In a report
for CISQ, Herb Krasner estimates that U.S. software technical debt is approximately
$1.52 trillion (and the cost of poor software quality is $2.41 trillion). Shocking but not surprising numbers, since a 2020
McKinsey CIO survey found that:
- 10-20% of the IT budget on new projects was diverted to technical debt issues;
- Tech debt amounts to 20-40% of the value of the entire technology estate (before depreciation).
- 60% felt their organization’s tech debt had risen perceptibly over the past 3 years.
No wonder that Professor Tufekci warns: “Without more government regulation and
oversight, and greater accountability, we may see more fiascos like this one,
which most likely stranded hundreds of thousands of Southwest passengers —
perhaps more than a million — over Christmas week. And not just for a single
company, as the problem is widespread across many industries.”
Including, and perhaps
especially, healthcare.
Professor Tufekci goes on to blame short term profit incentives,
like compensation based on quarterly earning and stock prices, for allowing
technical debt to accumulate. She notes:
…there are strong incentives to address any immediate problem by
essentially adding a bit of duct tape and wire to what you already have, rather
than spending a large amount of money — updating software is costly and
difficult — to address the root problem. Then you can cross your fingers and
hope that whatever catastrophe may be in the making, it erupts under someone else’s
future tenure.
Ultimately, the problem is that we haven’t built a regulatory
environment where companies have incentives to address technical debt, rather
than passing the burden on to customers, employees or the next management.
Healthcare didn’t need a bad winter storm to expose
its technical debt; it had a pandemic. From
front line caregivers to the healthcare supply chain to the public health
agencies intended to lead the fight against such mass health events, healthcare’s
technical debts became obvious. We didn’t
have the data, we didn’t have the communication, we didn’t have the right
tools, we didn’t have the necessary flexibility. Our healthcare system didn’t collapse, but it
wasn’t far off, and it was only staved off by heroic efforts of healthcare
workers and at an uncountable cost of lives.
But we didn’t need a pandemic to recognize healthcare’s
technical debt. Healthcare is heavily
dependent on software, but find me someone who is happy about any of it -- from
billing systems to scheduling systems to electronic records to claims systems to
an explosion of digital health “solutions.”
Technical debts are obvious to anyone who has ever had to fill out the
same information several times, get a CD to take test results from one
healthcare organization to another, or send a fax. Talk about 1990’s IT!llustration: BrĂ¡ulio Amado for Bloomberg Businessweek
Healthcare has had its Southwest moment, and, unlike
Southwest’s issues, people died. Most of
healthcare’s technical debts “only” result in extra work and/or inconvenience, but
some of them have more serious consequences, including loss of life. It cannot afford to have keep having technical
debt issues that someone is pushing off until “someone else’s future tenure,”
as Professor Tufecki put it.
Healthcare CEOs: you do not want to be the next Bob
Jordan. Start paying off your technical
debt.
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