You may have read the coverage of last week’s tar-and-feathering of Dr. Anthony Fauci in a hearing of the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic. You know, the one where Majorie Taylor Greene refused to call him “Dr.”, told him: “You belong in prison,” and accused him – I kid you not – of killing beagles. Yeah, that one.
Congressional hearings aren't the best way to find the truth. Credit: BBC |
Amidst all that drama, there were a few genuinely concerning findings.
For example, some of Dr. Fauci’s aides appeared to sometimes use personal email
accounts to avoid potential FOIA requests. It also turns out that Dr. Fauci and
others did take the lab leak theory seriously, despite many public denunciations
of that as a conspiracy theory. And, most breathtaking of all, Dr. Fauci
admitted that the 6 feet distancing rule “sort of just appeared,”
perhaps from the CDC and evidently not backed by any actual evidence.
I’m not intending to pick on Dr. Fauci, who I think has been a
dedicated public servant and possibly a hero. But it does appear that we sort
of fumbled our way through the pandemic, and that truth was often one of its
victims.
In The New York Times, Zeynep Tufekci minces no words:
I wish I could say these were all just examples of the science evolving in real time, but they actually demonstrate obstinacy, arrogance and cowardice. Instead of circling the wagons, these officials should have been responsibly and transparently informing the public to the best of their knowledge and abilities.
As she
goes on to say: “If the government
misled people about how Covid is transmitted, why would Americans believe what
it says about vaccines or bird flu or H.I.V.? How should people distinguish
between wild conspiracy theories and actual conspiracies?”
Credit: Menninger |
Echoing
Professor Tufekci’s concerns about mistrust, Michael Osterholm, the director of
the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of
Minnesota, told
Katherine Wu of The Atlantic his concerns about a potential bird flu
outbreak: “without a doubt, I think we’re less prepared.” He
specifically cited vaccine reluctance as an example.
, suggest full
disclosure: “This means our federal agencies must communicate what they don't
know as clearly as what they do know.”
But that
runs contrary to what Professor Tufekci says was her big takeaway from our
COVID response: “High-level
officials were afraid to tell the truth — or just to admit that they didn’t
have all the answers — lest they spook the public.”
A new
study highlights just how little we really knew. (Stanford)
and In
summary, we find no patterns in the overall set of models that suggests a clear
relationship between COVID-19 government responses and outcomes. Strong claims
about government responses’ impacts on COVID-19 may lack empirical support.”
In
an article in Stat News, they elaborate: “About half the time,
government policies were followed by better Covid-19 outcomes, and half of the
time they were not. The findings were sometimes contradictory, with some
policies appearing helpful when tested one way, and the same policy appearing
harmful when tested another way.”
They caution
that it’s not “broadly true” that government responses made things worse or
were simply ineffective, nor that they demonstrably helped either, but: “What is
true is that there is no strong evidence to support claims about the impacts of
the policies, one way or the other.”
Fifty-fifty. All those policies, all those recommendations,
all the turmoil, and it turns out we might as well just flipped a coin.
Like Professor
Tufekci, Dr. Gorman and colleagues, and Ms. Wu, they urge more honesty: “We
believe that having greater willingness to say “We’re not sure” will help
regain trust in science.” Professor
Zufekci quotes Congresswoman Deborah Ross (D-NC): “When people don’t trust scientists, they don’t trust the
science.” Right now, there’s a lot of people who neither trust the
science or the scientists, and it’s hard to blame them.
Professor Zufekci laments: “As the expression goes, trust is
built in drops and lost in buckets, and this bucket is going to take a very
long time to refill.” We may not have that kind of time before the next
crisis.
Professors Bendavid and Patel suggest more and better data
collection for critical health measures, on which the U.S. has an abysmal
record (case in point: bird flu), and more experimentation of public health
policies, which they admit “may
be ethically thorny and often impractical” (but, they point out, “subjecting
millions of people to untested policies without strong scientific support for
their benefits is also ethically charged”).
As I wrote
about last November, American’s trust in science is declining, with the Pew
Research Center confirming that the pandemic was a key turning point in
that decline. Professors Bendavid and Patel urge: “Matching the strength of claims to
the strength of the evidence may increase the sense that the scientific
community’s primary allegiance is to the pursuit of truth above all else,” but
in a crisis – as we were in 2020 – there may not be much, if any, evidence available
but yet we still are desperate for solutions.
We all need
to acknowledge that there are experts who know more about their fields than we
do, and stop trying to second guess or undermine them. But, in turn, those
experts need to be open about what they know, what they can prove, and what
they’re still not certain about. We all failed those tests in 2020-21, but,
unfortunately, we’re going to get retested at some point, and that may be sooner
rather than later.
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